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ABSTRACT
We present a general equilibrium model of the response of ﬁrms’ decisions to operate, innovate, and
engage in international trade to a change in the marginal cost of international trade. We ﬁnd that,
although a change in trade costs can have a substantial impact on heterogeneous ﬁrms’ exit, export,
and process innovation decisions, the impact of changes in these decisions on welfare is largely oﬀset
by the response of product innovation. Our results suggest that microeconomic evidence on ﬁrms’
responses to changes in international trade costs may not be informative about the implications of
changes in these trade costs for aggregate welfare.
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assistance, respectively. Any views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.I. Introduction
A large and rapidly growing empirical literature has documented that a reduction in interna-
tional trade costs can have a substantial impact on individual ﬁrms’ decisions to exit, export,
and invest in research and development both to improve the cost or quality of existing prod-
ucts and to create new products.1 Motivated by these observations, we build a simple general
equilibrium model to examine the question, Do considerations of the impact of a reduction
in trade costs on heterogeneous ﬁrms’ decisions to exit, export, and innovate lead to new
answers to the macroeconomic question about the impact of such cost changes on aggregate
welfare? Our answer is, largely, no.
The model we use in coming to this answer follows the recent literature on heteroge-
neous ﬁrms and international trade (e.g., Krugman 1980; Bernard et al. 2003; Melitz 2003;
and Helpman 2006). We model ﬁrms as producing diﬀerentiated products that are traded in-
ternationally subject to both ﬁxed and marginal costs of exporting. Our model of innovation
builds on Griliches’ (1979) knowledge capital model of ﬁrm productivity. In our model, each
ﬁrm has a stock of a ﬁrm-speciﬁc factor that determines its current proﬁt opportunities. The
model includes two forms of innovation: investment to increase the stock of this ﬁrm-speciﬁc
factor in an existing ﬁrm – process innovation – and investment to create new ﬁrms with
a new initial stock of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc factor – product innovation.
To begin, we use this model to study the eﬀects of a change in marginal trade costs on
an ideal measure of aggregate productivity that takes into account both the eﬀects of produc-
tivity improvements in existing goods and the introduction of new goods. We focus on this
ideal measure of productivity because it is the measure of productivity that is relevant for
welfare in our model.2 For this analysis, we decompose the change in aggregate productivity
that arises from a change in the marginal costs of trade into two components. The ﬁrst com-
ponent is the direct eﬀect of a change of trade costs on aggregate productivity, holding ﬁxed
ﬁrms’ exit, export, process, and product innovation decisions. The magnitude of this direct
eﬀect is determined simply by the share of exports in production, and hence is independent
of the details of our model of heterogeneous ﬁrms’ decisions. The second component is the
indirect eﬀect that arises from changes in ﬁrms’ exit, export, process, and product innovation
1Bernard et al. (2007) survey this literature. In addition, see the work of Bustos (2007), De Loecker
(2007), Lileeva and Treﬂer (2007), and Aw, Roberts, and Xu (2009).
2As we discuss in Section IV.E, this ideal measure of aggregate productivity does not necessarily correspond
to aggregate productivity as measured in the data. Our model’s implications for aggregate productivity as
measured in the data depend on the assumptions that one makes in mapping the model to the data.decisions caused by the change in trade costs.
What determines the magnitude of this indirect eﬀect? A theoretical literature stem-
ming from the work of Krugman (1980), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Rivera-Batiz
and Romer (1991) has studied this question, focusing only on the impact of a change in inter-
national trade costs on ﬁrms’ decisions to create new product varieties, that is, to engage in
product innovation. Our main ﬁnding is that our more complex model, which also takes into
account the heterogeneous responses of ﬁrms’ exit, export, process, and product innovation
decisions, leads to largely the same implications for the magnitude of the indirect eﬀect of a
reduction in trade costs on aggregate productivity as found in this earlier literature. Whereas
when ﬁrms are heterogeneous, a change in international trade costs can substantially aﬀect
ﬁrms’ exit, export, and process innovation decisions, the impact of changes in these deci-
sions on aggregate productivity is largely oﬀset in general equilibrium by changes in product
innovation.
We ﬁrst present this ﬁnding regarding the steady-state impact of a change in marginal
trade costs on aggregate productivity as an analytical result for three special cases of our
model. In the ﬁrst special case, we assume that all ﬁrms export.T h i ss p e c i ﬁcation extends
the work of Krugman (1980) by considering ﬁrms’ exit and process innovation decisions, as
well as their product innovation decisions. In the second special case, only the most productive
ﬁrms export, but ﬁrms have no productivity dynamics after entry. Hence, this speciﬁcation
corresponds to the Melitz (2003) model. In the third special case, the exogenous-selection
v e r s i o no fo u rm o d e l ,ﬁrms have productivity dynamics due to endogenous process innovation,
but their exit and export decisions are independent of ﬁrm size. In all cases we assume
symmetric countries, and in the second and third cases, we also assume that the real interest
rate is close to zero. We show analytically that the indirect eﬀect on aggregate productivity
of a change in the marginal costs of trade is, to a ﬁrst-order approximation, the same in all
three of these special cases and is equal to the indirect eﬀect found by the earlier models with
only product innovation. Hence, for our special cases, the details of how a change in trade
costs aﬀects ﬁrms’ exit, export, and process innovation decisions have no ﬁrst-order eﬀects
on the model’s implications for aggregate productivity in the steady state.
We ﬁnd this result striking because diﬀerent speciﬁcations of our model give rise to
very diﬀerent implications for ﬁrms’ exit, export, and process innovation decisions at the
micro level. In particular, when ﬁrms are heterogeneous, a reduction in trade costs leads
2to a reallocation of production, export status, and investments in process innovation from
smaller, less-productive, non-exporting ﬁrms to larger, more-productive, exporting ﬁrms,
and this reallocation does lead to a change in the productivity of the average ﬁrm and to an
ampliﬁcation of productivity diﬀerences across ﬁrms that results in a larger increase in the
volume of international trade. Yet this reallocation does not have a ﬁrst-order eﬀect for the
model’s implications for aggregate productivity. Why?
The logic of our result follows from ﬁrms’ free-entry condition: the proﬁts associated
with creating a new product must be zero in equilibrium. Ceteris paribus, a reduction in
international trade costs raises the proﬁts associated with creating a new product. In equi-
librium, to satisfy the free-entry condition, this increase in expected proﬁts must be oﬀset by
an increase in the real wage and a change in aggregate output, both of which are determined
by aggregate productivity. We prove our result by showing that the change in aggregate
productivity required in equilibrium is, to a ﬁrst-order approximation, independent of the
details of ﬁrms’ exit, export, and process innovation decisions. In our three special cases,
the free-entry condition requires that whatever change in the productivity of the average
ﬁrm that arises from changes in heterogeneous ﬁrms’ exit, export, and process innovation
decisions must be oﬀset by a change in product innovation so as to ensure that the response
of aggregate productivity is consistent with equilibrium.
In establishing our analytical results, we make strong assumptions. To extend these
results when some of these assumptions are relaxed, we solve the model numerically. We
consider a parameterized version of our model that accounts for some salient features on
the share of exporters in output and employment and the ﬁrm size distribution in the U.S.
economy. Our quantitative results conﬁrm our analytical ﬁndings regarding the ﬁrst-order
eﬀects of a change in marginal trade costs on aggregate productivity across steady states,
both when the interest rate is low and when ﬁrms’ investments in process innovation are
inelastic to changes in the incentives to innovate.
We ﬁnd, however, that in a speciﬁcation of our model with both positive interest rates
and elastic process innovation, the changes in ﬁrms’ process and product innovation decisions
are not fully oﬀsetting. This is why we qualify our answer to the question that motivates our
work here. However, we ﬁnd that the response of aggregate productivity due to this indirect
eﬀect is at least an order of magnitude smaller than the response of the productivity of
the average ﬁrm due to changes in ﬁrms’ process innovation decisions. We also calculate the
3welfare implications of a change in trade costs, taking into account considerations of transition
dynamics. We ﬁnd that with positive interest rates and elastic process innovation, the change
in aggregate productivity across steady states is not associated with a substantial change in
welfare relative to the model with inelastic process innovation. Whatever welfare gains across
steady state that do occur are substantially reduced by the slow transition dynamics from
one steady state to another implied by our model.
Our model is related to several models in the literature. When our ﬁrms’ process
innovation choices are inelastic, our model is an open economy version of the models of
Hopenhayn (1992) and Luttmer (2007a) in which ﬁrms experience exogenous random shocks
to their productivity.3 Our model of process innovation is similar to that of Ericson and Pakes
(1995), in which the fruits of innovative activity are stochastic. With this assumption, our
model can account for simultaneous growth and decline, and entry and exit of ﬁrms in steady
state.4 Our model is also related to those of Yeaple (2005), Bustos (2007), and Costantini and
Melitz (2008); these researchers study the adoption of technology improvements by exporters
and non-exporters in response to a change in trade costs.5 Our result that a change in
international trade costs has no impact on innovative eﬀort if all ﬁr m se x p o r te c h o e st h e
result of Eaton and Kortum (2001) in a model of quality ladders embedded in a multi-
country Ricardian model of international trade. Our work also complements that on ﬁrm-level
innovation by Klette and Kortum (2004) and Lentz and Mortensen (2008).
Our work here is also related to a large literature on the aggregate implications of
trade liberalizations. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008) study a variant of Melitz’s (2003)
model that features endogenous growth through spillovers. They show that a reduction
in international trade costs can increase or decrease growth through changes in product
innovation, depending on the nature of the spillovers and the form of the production function
of new goods. Our model abstracts from such spillovers.
Arkolakis et al. (2008) and Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2010) calculate
the welfare gains from trade in a wide class of trade models that abstract from process
innovation (including the Krugman 1980 and Melitz 2003 model with Pareto productivities
3Such a model is also considered by Irarrazabal and Opromolla (2008). Furthermore, Arkolakis (2008)
extends this model of ﬁrm dynamics to account for other salient features of the data on ﬁrm dynamics by
domestic and exporting ﬁrms.
4Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2008) estimate a Griliches’ knowledge capital model in which innovative
investments within the ﬁrm also lead to stochastic productivity improvements.
5See also the related work of Navas-Ruiz and Sala (2007) and Long, Raﬀ, and Stähler (2008).
4that we consider here). They show that in these models, the welfare gains of trade only
depend on the level of trade shares before and after the change in trade costs, and on the
gravity-based elasticity of trade to changes in trade costs, and not on other details of the
model such as endogenous exit and export decisions. For the models considered in these
papers and ours, the message is similar. The primary diﬀerence between these papers and
ours is in the thought experiment considered. In our paper, we consider the impact of a
given change in marginal trade costs (small changes for our analytic results, larger changes in
our quantitative analysis) on welfare across diﬀerent models. In contrast, they consider the
impact of a change in marginal trade costs (of any size) on welfare, given that this change
in trade costs results in the same change in trade shares across models. In addition, they
consider models with asymmetric countries. We extend our results to the case of asymmetric
countries in Section IV.E.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents our model, and Section III
characterizes its symmetric steady-state equilibrium. Section IV characterizes the steady-
state impact of a change in international trade costs in speciﬁcations of our model that we
can solve for analytically. Section V extends the results of Section IV to speciﬁcations that
we must solve numerically. Section VI concludes. The Appendix provides proofs for our
analytical results and other details.
II. The Model
Time is discrete, and each period is labeled  =0 12The economy has two countries:
home and foreign; variables of the foreign country are denoted with a star. Households in
each country are endowed with  units of time.
Production in each country is structured as follows. There is a single, ﬁnal, nontraded
good that can be consumed or used in innovative activities, a continuum of diﬀerentiated
intermediate goods that are produced and can be internationally traded subject to ﬁxed and
variable trade costs, and a nontraded intermediate good that we call the research good.T h i s
research good is produced using a combination of ﬁnal output and labor, and is used to pay
the costs associated with both process and product innovation, as well as the ﬁxed costs
of exporting and production. The productivities of the ﬁrms producing the diﬀerentiated
intermediate goods are determined endogenously through equilibrium process innovation,
and the measure of diﬀerentiated intermediate goods produced in each country is determined
endogenously through product innovation.
5Intermediate goods are each produced by heterogeneous ﬁrms indexed by two ﬁrm-
speciﬁc state variables,  and , which index the ﬁrm’s productivity and its ﬁxed costs of
exporting, respectively. In what follows, we index the ﬁrm’s production, pricing, and export
decisions by these state variables. We assume that the ﬁxed costs of exporting, ,t a k eo n
a ﬁnite number of values. A ﬁrm’s ﬁxed costs of exporting  evolve exogenously for each
ﬁrm according to a Markov process in which the distribution of this cost next period, given
ac o s t this period, is Γ(0
|).
A ﬁr mi nt h eh o m ec o u n t r yw i t hs t a t ev a r i a b l e s =( ) has productivity equal to
exp()1(−1) and produces output () with labor () according to the constant returns to
scale production technology:6
 =e x p ( )
1(−1).( 1 )
In addition, in order to operate, the ﬁrm requires ﬁxed costs of  units of the research good
every period. We rescale ﬁrm productivity using the exponent 1( − 1) for expositional
convenience, where 1. As we explain below, with this rescaling, each ﬁrm’s equilibrium
labor and variable proﬁts are proportional to exp().
The output of a home country ﬁrm can be used to produce the home ﬁnal good, with
the quantity of this domestic absorption denoted () Alternatively, some of this output can
be exported to the foreign country to produce the foreign ﬁnal good. The quantity of the
output of the home ﬁrm used in the foreign country is denoted ∗
().
International trade is subject to both ﬁxed and iceberg type costs of exporting. The
iceberg type of marginal costs of exporting is denominated in terms of the intermediate good
being exported. The ﬁrm must export ∗ units of output, with  ≥ 1,i no r d e rt oh a v e
∗ units of output arrive in the foreign country for use in the production of the foreign ﬁnal
good.
Let  () ∈ {01} be an indicator of the export decision of home ﬁrms with state




6For standard reasons, the ﬁrm’s productivity in our model can be reinterpreted as a measure of the ﬁrm’s
product quality (so that ﬁrms innovate to improve the quality rather than to increase their productivity),
without changing our ﬁndings. Our model can also be easily extended to include other forms of physical and
human capital as variable factors of production. Consideration of these forms of capital would lead to the
standard ampliﬁcation of the impact of changes in productivity on output.
6and that  () u n i t so ft h er e s e a r c hg o o db eu s e dt op a yt h eﬁxed costs of exporting.
A ﬁrm in the foreign country with state variables  has the same production technology
as the home ﬁrm, but with output denoted ∗
() labor ∗
() and domestic absorption ∗
()
Exports to the home country,  (), are subject to both ﬁxed and marginal costs; hence,
feasibility requires that ∗
()()+∗
()=∗
() and that ∗
 () units of the foreign
research good be used to pay the ﬁxed costs of exporting.
The home ﬁnal good  is produced from home and foreign intermediate goods with a

















where  () is the distribution of operating ﬁrms in the home country over the state 
and ﬁxed export cost ,a n d∗
 the corresponding distribution in the foreign country. In
particular, the measure of ﬁrms in the home country with  ∈ (1 2] and ﬁxed export cost
equal to  is given by
R 2
1  ()d, and the total measure of operating ﬁrms in the home
country is given by 
R
 ()d. Production of the ﬁnal good in the foreign country is
deﬁned analogously.
The ﬁnal good in the home country is produced by competitive ﬁrms that choose
output  and inputs () and () subject to (3), in order to maximize proﬁts while taking
as given prices of the ﬁnal and intermediate goods , () (); export decisions ()
∗
(); and distributions of operating intermediate good ﬁrms  and ∗
 . All prices in the
home country in period  are stated relative to the price of the research good in that country


































Analogous equations hold for prices and quantities in the foreign country.
7T h er e s e a r c hg o o di nt h eh o m ec o u n t r yi sp r o d u c e dw i t hac o n s t a n tr e t u r n st os c a l e




 units of the research good, with the share of labor in research output denoted
by  ∈ (01]. The foreign research good is produced symmetrically. We denote the relative
price of the research good across countries by  ∗
. In each country, the research good is




































1− .( 7 )
Here,  (or ∗
 ) denotes the wage for workers in the home (or foreign) country.
Intermediate good ﬁrms in each country are monopolistically competitive. A home
ﬁrm with state variables  faces a static proﬁt maximization problem of choosing labor input
() prices () ∗
() quantities () ∗
() and whether or not to export  (),i no r d e r
to maximize current period proﬁts, taking as given the wage rate , and prices and output
of the ﬁn a lg o o di nb o t hc o u n t r i e s∗
   and  ∗
  This proﬁt maximization problem is
written as






∗ −  −  (8)
s u b j e c tt o( 1 ) ,( 2 ) ,a n d( 5 ) .
Productivity at the ﬁrm level evolves over time depending on the ﬁrm’s investments in
improving its productivity and on idiosyncratic productivity shocks. We model this evolution
as follows. At the beginning of each period  every existing ﬁrm has a probability  of exiting
exogenously and a probability 1− of surviving to produce. Surviving ﬁrms can choose either
to exit or to continue to operate and pay the ﬁxed costs of operation  in terms of the research
good. A continuing ﬁrm with state  that invests exp()() units of the research good in
improving its productivity in the current period  has a probability  of having productivity
exp( + ∆)1(−1) and a probability 1 −  of having productivity exp( − ∆)1(−1) in the
next period +1 We refer to the ﬁrm’s choice of  as its process innovation decision,a n dt o
the ﬁrm’s expenditure of exp()() units of the research good as its investment in process
8innovation.W ea s s u m et h a t() is increasing and convex in 7
With this evolution of ﬁrm productivity, the expected, discounted present value of
proﬁts for a ﬁrm with state variables  satisﬁes a Bellman equation:





 ()=m a x
∈[01]












where Π() is given by (8) and  is the world interest rate in period  (in units of the home
research good). Note that here we express this Bellman equation for the ﬁrm’s expected,
discounted present value of proﬁts () in units of the research good. We ﬁnd this convention
useful in characterizing equilibrium. We let () denote the optimal process innovation
decision of the ﬁrm in the problem (10).
Since for each value of  the value function of operating ﬁrms  0
 () is strictly
increasing in  clearly, in each period  the decision of ﬁrms to operate (9) follows a cutoﬀ
rule, with ﬁrms with productivity at or above a cutoﬀ ¯ () choosing to operate and ﬁrms
with productivity below that cutoﬀ exiting. Note that if  =0 ,t h e n 
 ()=() and
¯ ()=−∞; hence, there is no endogenous exit.
New ﬁrms are created with an investment of the research good. Investment of  units
o ft h er e s e a r c hg o o di np e r i o d yields a new ﬁrm in period  +1 , with initial state variables







Note that both sides of this equation are expressed in units of the research good. Let 
denote the measure of new ﬁrms entering in period  that start producing in period  +1 .
The analogous Bellman equation holds for the foreign ﬁr m sa sw e l l .W er e f e rt o as the
7With this scaling of the innovation cost function, exp(), we are assuming that the process innovation
cost required to increase the size of the ﬁrm by a ﬁxed percentage scales with the size of the ﬁrm. This will
imply that, for suﬃciently large ﬁrms, their growth rate is independent of size, consistent with Gibrat’s law.
Note also that if the time period is small, then our binomial productivity process approximates a geometric
Brownian motion in continuous time, as in the work of Luttmer (2007a). Our model diﬀers from Luttmer’s
in that our ﬁrms control the drift of this process through investment of the research good.
9product innovation decision because this is the mechanism through which new diﬀerentiated
products are produced.
Households in the home country have preferences of the form
P∞
=0 
 log(),w h e r e
 is their consumption of the home ﬁn a lg o o di np e r i o d and  ≤ 1 is their discount factor.
Households in the foreign country have preferences of the same form over consumption of the
foreign ﬁnal good ∗
  Each household in the home country faces an intertemporal budget
constraint of the form









( − ) ≤ ¯ ,( 1 2 )
where ¯  is the value of the initial stock of assets held by the household. Households in the
foreign country face similar budget constraints with wages, prices, and assets all labeled with
stars.
Feasibility requires that for the ﬁnal good,
 +  =  (13)
in the home country, and the analogous constraint holds in the foreign country. The feasibility
constraint on labor in the home country is given by

Z
() ()d +  =  (14)
where 
R
() ()d denotes total employment in the production of intermediate
goods and  denotes employment in the production of the research good and likewise in the
foreign country.
The feasibility constraint on the research good in the home country is
 +
Z





and likewise in the foreign country.
The evolution of the distribution of operating ﬁrms  over time is given by the
exogenous probability of exit , the decisions of operating ﬁrms to invest in their productivity
(), and the measure of entering ﬁrms in period ,  The distribution of operating ﬁrms
10+1(0 0
) i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r yi np e r i o d+1is equal to the sum of three inﬂows of ﬁrms:
new ﬁrms founded in period  ﬁrms continuing from period  that draw positive productivity
shocks (and, hence, had productivity equal to 0 − ∆ in period ) and ﬁrms continuing
from period  that draw negative productivity shocks (and, hence, had productivity equal to
0 + ∆ in period ). We write this as follows:















1 − ( + ∆ )
¢
( + ∆ )Γ(
0
|)
For 0  ¯ 0
+1(0
), +1(0 0
)=0 . The evolution of ∗
 () for foreign ﬁr m si sd e ﬁned
analogously.
We assume that the households in each country own those ﬁrms that initially exist in
period 0 Thus, we require that the initial assets of the households in both countries sum to
t h et o t a lv a l u eo ft h e s eﬁrms:
¯  + ¯ 
∗ =
Z






0 ()d.( 1 7 )




} and prices for intermediate goods {() ∗
() ()
∗
()}, a collection of sequences of aggregate quantities {∗




quantities of the intermediate goods {() ∗
() () ∗
() () ∗
()}, initial assets ¯ 
¯  ∗ and a collection of sequences of ﬁrm value functions and proﬁt, exit, export, and process
innovation decisions {() ∗
 () 
 ()∗
 () Π() Π∗
() ¯  () ¯ ∗ () () ∗
()
() ∗
()} together with distributions of operating ﬁrms and measures of entering ﬁrms
{  ∗
  ∗
} such that households in each country maximize their utility subject to
their budget constraints, intermediate good ﬁr m si ne a c hc o u n t r ym a x i m i z ew i t h i n - p e r i o d
proﬁts, ﬁnal good ﬁrms in each country maximize proﬁts, all of the feasibility constraints are
satisﬁed, and the distribution of operating ﬁr m se v o l v ea sd e s c r i b e da b o v e .
In most of our analysis, we focus our attention on equilibria that are symmetric in
two basic ways. We assume that the distribution of initial assets is such that expenditures
are equal across countries in period 0 and, hence, in every period. We also assume that
11each country starts with the same distribution of operating ﬁrms by productivity and, hence,
because prices and wages are equal across countries, continue to have the same distribution of
operating ﬁrms by productivity in each subsequent period. In such a symmetric equilibrium,
we have  =  ∗
   = ∗
   = ∗
  ∗
 ,a n d∗
 =1 .
A steady state of our model is an equilibrium in which all of the aggregate variables
are constant. A symmetric steady state is an equilibrium that is both symmetric in our sense
and a steady state. In what follows, we omit time subscripts when discussing steady states.
Depending on parameter values, there are two types of symmetric steady states in our model:
one with entry and one without entry. We focus on symmetric steady states with entry.
III. The Symmetric Steady State
Now we present the equations that characterize a symmetric steady-state equilibrium with
entry. We ﬁrst characterize the ﬁrms’ pricing, exit, export, and process innovation decisions.
We show that these decisions are the solution to a one-dimensional ﬁxed-point problem. We
then characterize the aggregate quantities and prices, taking as given the ﬁrms’ decisions.
Finally, we present a central result: In the steady state, the combined impact of ﬁrms’ exit,
export, and process and product innovation decisions on aggregate productivity must oﬀset
each other in order to keep ﬁrms’ proﬁts consistent with free entry.
A. Firm Decisions
Consider the static proﬁt maximization problem (8) for an operating ﬁrm in the home country.
All operating ﬁrms choose a constant markup over their marginal costs, so that equilibrium












Given the demand of ﬁnal good ﬁrms for intermediate inputs (5), home intermediate
ﬁrms with state variables  have variable proﬁts on their home sales in terms of the numeraire,




 ( − 1)
1− ,( 1 8 )
and variable proﬁts Πexp() on their foreign sales, with Π = Π1−. A si ss t a n d a r d ,
domestic variable proﬁts are decreasing in the real wage , increasing in the price charged
12by other ﬁrms , and increasing in the scale of ﬁnal good production  .
Total static proﬁts are
Π()=Π exp()+m a x( Πexp() − 0).( 1 9 )
We now characterize the ﬁrms’ exit, export, and process innovation decisions as the
unique solution of a one-dimensional ﬁxed-point problem. We solve for a ﬁxed point over the
constant Π in ﬁrms’ variable proﬁts, as deﬁn e di n( 1 8 ) .
To do so, consider ﬁrst ﬁrms’ export decisions, (). Given a value of Π,t h e s e
decisions are determined by the static condition that variable proﬁts from exports must
exceed ﬁxed costs of exporting, or
()=1if and only if Π
1− exp() ≥  (20)
To solve for ﬁrms’ steady-state exit and process innovation decisions, we must solve
the ﬁrms’ Bellman equation, (9), removing the time subscripts from all variables and letting
 =1 . Standard arguments give that this Bellman equation has a unique solution  (),
corresponding to any given value of Π under appropriate parameter restrictions.8 In addition,
the solution for  () is weakly increasing in Π, while the value function of operating ﬁrms,
 (), is strictly increasing in Π.
We use the free-entry condition (11) to solve for the equilibrium value of Π.T os e e
that a unique solution for Π exists, ﬁrst observe that the right side of the free-entry condition
(11) is weakly increasing in Π and that if it is strictly positive (when a positive mass of newly
entering ﬁrms chooses to operate), then it is also strictly increasing in Π. Second, note that
the right side of (11) is equal to zero when Π =0and becomes arbitrarily large as Π gets
large. Since the ﬁxed costs of entry are strictly positive, there is a unique solution for Π.
The solution to this problem now gives us ﬁrms’ exit decisions ¯  (), export decisions
(), and process innovation decisions (). These decisions, under certain parameter re-
8The parameter restrictions required ensure that the net present value of ﬁrms’ proﬁts remain bounded
for any choice of process innovation. A strong suﬃcient condition is that  (1 − )exp(∆)  1.W h e n
numerically solving our model, we check the following weaker suﬃcient conditions: for all  ∈ [01] such that
 (1 − )[exp(∆)+( 1− )exp(∆)] ≥ 1, we need Π
¡
1+1−¢
− ()  0. The interpretation of this
condition is that if it is possible for a ﬁrm to choose process innovation so that variable proﬁts grow faster
than the interest rate, then the variable proﬁts associated with this process innovation decision are negative.
13strictions, imply from (16) a steady-state distribution of state variables across ﬁrms scaled
by the mass of entering ﬁrms, ˜  ()= (). The parameter restrictions required im-
ply that the equilibrium process innovation decision of large ﬁrms leads them to shrink in
expectation.9
B. Aggregate Quantities and Prices
Now assume that the ﬁrms’ exit, export, and process innovation decisions are given and lead
to a steady-state scaled distribution across states, ˜  (). To solve for aggregate quantities




[1 − ()]exp() ˜  ()d,a n d ( 2 1 )
 = 
Z
()exp() ˜  ()d.
The ﬁrst of these, , is an index of productivity aggregated across all operating, non-
exporting home ﬁrms, and the second, , is an index of productivity aggregated across all
home ﬁrms that export, both scaled by the mass of entering ﬁrms. In a symmetric steady
state,  is also an index of productivity aggregated across all foreign ﬁr m st h a te x p o r tt o
t h eh o m ec o u n t r y .
From the ﬁrm’s static proﬁt maximization problem (8), we have that the production













.( 2 2 )
Given that ﬁrm revenues are proportional to ﬁrm employment, the share of exports in the





9As u ﬃcient condition for this is lim→∞(1 − ){()exp(∆)+[ 1− ()]exp(−∆)}  1, for all
values of . In the event that the ﬁrms’ exit, export, and process innovation decisions calculated as above
do not imply a steady-state distrib u t i o no fs t a t ev a r i a b l e sa c r o s sﬁrms scaled by the mass of entering ﬁrms,
then a steady-state equilibrium with entry does not exist. In a steady-state equilibrium without entry, the
expected growth of continuing ﬁr m si se x a c t l yo ﬀset by exit. In this case, aggregate variables are constant
but the distribution of ﬁr m sb ys i z ei sn o t .
14Note that the share of total production employment accounted for by exporters is (1 + 1−)1−
We compute the average expenditures on the research good per entering ﬁrm, which
we denote by Υ with
Υ =  +
Z
[ + () +e x p ( )(())] ˜  ()d.( 2 4 )
Given Π, , ,a n dΥ, the symmetric steady-state values of ,  , , , ,
























¢¤1(−1) ( − ),( 2 6 )
 =

 +  ( − 1)
,( 2 7 )
Π =

 (1 − )
1−
 ( − 1)
1− ()







,( 2 9 )
where  = Π [ +  (1 + 1−)]Υ is the ratio of total variable proﬁts to total expenditures
on the research good. We derive these equations in the Appendix. Note that expressions (25)
and (26) depend on  because they are derived under the assumption of symmetry across
countries.
Since labor is the only variable factor of production, our ideal measure of aggregate










¢¤1(−1).( 3 0 )
C. The Aggregate Allocation of Labor
In solving our model, we use the following two lemmas regarding the aggregate allocation
of employment and the ratio of consumption to ﬁnal output. Lemma 1 states that these
two variables change with a change in marginal trade costs only if the ratio of total variable
proﬁts to total expenditures on the research good also changes. We show in lemma 2 that
15as the interest rate approaches zero ( → 1), then the aggregate allocation of labor and the
ratio of consumption to ﬁnal output approach constants that are independent of marginal
trade costs.
Lemma 1. The steady-state allocation of labor to produce the research good, ,a n d
the steady-state ratio of consumption to output, , are functions of only the ratio of total
variable proﬁts to total expenditures on the research good, , and the parameters , ,a n d
.
Proof. The ﬁrst part of this lemma is implied by (27), which can be derived as follows.
From the CES ﬁnal good aggregator, payments to production employment are a ﬁxed ratio
of variable proﬁts:
 ( − )=(  − 1)Π
£




From the Cobb-Douglas production function of the research good, research labor is a constant
cost share of the value of research output:
 = Υ.






Π [( + )+1−]
Υ
,
from which we obtain (27). The second part of the lemma is implied by (29). QED.
Lemma 2. As  → 1,  becomes a constant fraction of the labor force given by
 =[ ( +  − 1)], independent of the trade cost .
Proof. Free entry requires that for an entering ﬁrm, the expected present value of
variable proﬁts equals the expected present value of expenditures on the research good. In
a steady state in which the interest rate converges to zero, these expected present values are
equal to their cross-sectional averages across ﬁrms. That is, as  → 1,  → 1.M o r ed e t a i l s
are given in the Appendix.
D. A Recursive Algorithm to Solve the Steady State
Together, these two lemmas give us the following algorithm to solve for a symmetric steady
state of the model as a function of the marginal trade cost . First, we use the free-entry
16condition (11) to solve for the equilibrium value of Π. Associated with the equilibrium value
of Π are ﬁrms’ exit, export, and process innovation decisions, which determine the aggregate
productivity indices  and , as well as the average expenditures per entering ﬁrm on the
research good Υ Then, we use (27) to compute  and (25), (26), and (28) to solve for the
equilibrium product innovation . Expressions (26) and (29) then determine output and
consumption.
With this algorithm, we see that our model has a certain recursive structure. In
equilibrium, the free-entry condition pins down ﬁrms’ exit, export, and process innovation
decisions as well as the aggregate allocation of labor between production employment and
research. Product innovation then adjusts to satisfy the remaining equilibrium conditions.10
We use this recursive structure of our model to analyze the impact of a change in
marginal trade costs on the steady-state equilibrium levels of aggregate productivity, output,
and welfare. From (30), we know that aggregate productivity is determined by the exit,
export, and process and product innovation decisions of ﬁrms. A central result of this work is
that, in the steady state, the impact of these decisions on aggregate productivity must oﬀset
each other in order for ﬁrms’ proﬁts to be consistent with free entry. In particular, from the
steady-state equilibrium conditions, (25), (26), and (28), we have that
∆logΠ =( 2−  − )∆log + ∆log( − ),( 3 1 )
where ∆ denotes the total derivative of a variable.
The intuition for (31) is as follows. The free-entry condition, as captured by our Bell-
man equation, pins down how the variable proﬁts earned by a ﬁrm with a given productivity
level must change in response to a change in marginal trade costs. With (18), this change in
variable proﬁts also pins down the change in the real wage and aggregate output that must
occur in the new steady state. Since the real wage and aggregate output are determined
by aggregate productivity and the aggregate allocation of labor, we have that the free-entry
condition for ﬁrms pins down how aggregate productivity and the aggregate allocation of
10This recursive structure relies on our assumption that all innovation activities use the same research
good. If diﬀerent inputs were required for product and process innovation, then a change in trade costs might
aﬀect the relative price of the inputs into these activities and, thus, aﬀect equilibrium process innovation.
Similarly, our recursive structure would also break if the cost of product innovation  depended on the level
of product innovation. In these cases, the full model must be solved simultaneously and our results might
change.
17labor must respond to a change in marginal trade costs.
The economics of the coeﬃcient on aggregate productivity in (31) is as follows. An
increase in aggregate productivity raises the real wage and output one-for-one and decreases
the price of the ﬁn a lg o o di nt e r m so ft h er e s e a r c hg o o da tt h er a t e. From (18), we know
that the combined eﬀect of an increase in aggregate productivity on the constant on variable
proﬁts is given by (2 −  − );h e n c e ,t h a tt e r mi st h ea p p r o p r i a t ec o e ﬃcient.
In what follows, we impose the parameter restriction  + 2 so that an increase
in aggregate productivity lowers the constant on variable proﬁts. When this restriction is
violated, choosing an unbounded level of entry  and consumption  in the steady state
is socially optimal. To see this, consider a planner seeking to choose  and  in order to
maximize  =  −, with the levels of , , Υ,a n d held ﬁxed. Using (15) to solve for






 ,w i t h
0. This function is concave in  and, hence, has an interior maximum if and only if
 + 2. Therefore, when this condition is violated, setting  = ∞ is optimal. In our
dynamic model, if +2, the equilibrium has explosive growth and unbounded utility. In
the knife-edged case of + =2 , as we discuss in Section IV.E, the equilibrium has balanced
endogenous growth through product innovation.11
IV. Trade Costs and Aggregate Productivity: Analytical Results
In this section, we analytically study the impact of a change in marginal trade costs on our
ideal measure of aggregate productivity for three special cases of our model. In the ﬁrst special
case, we assume that all ﬁrms export. In the second special case, only the most productive
ﬁrms export, but ﬁrms have no productivity dynamics after entry; hence, this special case of
our model corresponds to the model of Melitz (2003). In the third special case, which we
refer to as the exogenous-selection version of our model, ﬁrms have endogenous productivity
dynamics from process innovation, but ﬁrms’ exit and export decisions are independent of
size. In the second and third special cases, we also assume that the real interest rate is
zero. We show here that a change in those trade costs has the same impact on steady-state
11Given the parameter assumption that  + 2, we can show that the social planner chooses exit,
export, and process innovation decisions in the steady state equal to those chosen in equilibrium. Moreover,
the optimal and equilibrium steady-state allocations are identical if  =1 , and the optimal levels of output,
consumption, and product innovation are higher than the equilibrium level of these variables when 1.
The intuition for this result is that the equilibrium monopoly distortion alters the value of entry relative to
the cost of entry. A production subsidy remedies this distortion without changing the main results in this
paper.
18productivity, to a ﬁrst-order approximation, in all three special cases.
To a ﬁrst-order approximation, a change in marginal international trade costs  has
two types of eﬀects on aggregate productivity. One eﬀect is direct; productivity changes only
because of the change in trade costs, with ﬁrms’ exit, export, process, and product innovation
decisions held ﬁxed. The other eﬀect of a trade cost change is indirect eﬀect; it arises from
changes in these decisions, which are themselves responding to the trade cost change. More
formally, from equation (30), the change in aggregate productivity from a change in trade
costs is




















The indirect eﬀect of a change in trade costs on aggregate productivity itself has two compo-
nents. The ﬁrst component (that is, the sum of the ﬁrst two terms in brackets) is the indirect
eﬀect of a change in trade costs on the productivity of the average ﬁrm. The second compo-
nent, given by ∆log( − 1), is the indirect eﬀect that arises from product innovation, or
t h ec r e a t i o no fn e wﬁrms.
To calculate the indirect eﬀect on aggregate productivity, we proceed as follows. The
expression (31) can be written as
∆logΠ =( 2−  − ) × (Direct Eﬀect + Indirect Eﬀect)+∆log( − ).( 3 3 )
For our three special cases, we show below that from the Bellman equation, we know that
the steady-state change in the constant in variable proﬁts that is consistent with free entry
is given by
∆logΠ =(  − 1)∆log =( 1− ) × (Direct Eﬀect).( 3 4 )
When all ﬁrms export, or when the interest rate approaches zero, the steady-state aggregate
allocation of labor is unchanged with ,s ot h a t∆log( − )=0 . (See lemmas 1 and 2 for
t h ec a s ei nw h i c h → 1.) Plugging these results into (33) gives that the ratio of the indirect





 +  − 2
.( 3 5 )
This expression (35) is a straightforward implication of a standard model of trade with ho-
mogeneous ﬁrms and monopolistic competition, no productivity dynamics, no ﬁxed costs of
production or exporting, and no spillovers, such as the model described by Krugman (1980).
Our main result is that (35) characterizes the relative size of the indirect and direct
eﬀects in all three special cases of our model. This result has two important implications:
• If  =1 , so that the research good is produced entirely with labor, then there is no
indirect eﬀect. Hence, the steady-state change in productivity, to a ﬁrst-order approx-
imation, is simply the direct eﬀect. This means that in equilibrium, the changes in
productivity induced by changes in ﬁrms’ exit, export, process, and product innovation
decisions (that is, the indirect eﬀect) must entirely oﬀset each other, to a ﬁrst-order
approximation, in the new steady state.
• Under the more general assumption that 1, the indirect eﬀect on productivity has
t h es a m em a g n i t u d e ,t oaﬁrst-order approximation, regardless of endogenous process
innovation and endogenous or exogenous choices by ﬁrms to export and exit.
Later, we explore the extent to which this analytical result holds in more general cases
of our model.
When computing the welfare eﬀects of a change in marginal trade costs ,w em u s t
consider the impact of this change on consumption in the steady state and its transition
dynamics. In lemma 1, we have proven that the change in the ratio of consumption to
output in the steady state is determined by the same factor  that determines the aggregate
allocation of labor, . Since in all three special cases of our model,  remains constant,
we have that steady-state consumption moves one-for-one with steady-state output and that
the steady-state change in aggregate output is equal to the change in aggregate productivity.
The transition dynamics are computed numerically in Section V. However, in Section IV.D,
we discuss why, if the steady-state eﬀects of a change in marginal trade costs are large, then
the transition dynamics are slow.
T h el i n eo fa r g u m e n tw eu s eh e r et oa n a l y z et h ed i r e c ta n di n d i r e c te ﬀects arising from
a change in trade costs does not extend naturally to the analysis of a change in import tariﬀs
20that are rebated to a household. A change in tariﬀs does not entail the same direct eﬀect as
a change in trade costs because it does not change the resources consumed in international
trade. It is possible, however, to show that, to a ﬁrst-order approximation, the response of
aggregate productivity to a change in tariﬀs is the same in all three special cases of our model
if tariﬀs are initially zero.
A. All Firms Export
We start the analysis of this case by establishing, in proposition 1, that in an economy
with no ﬁxed costs of international trade, changes in the marginal costs of trade have no
impact at all on the incentives of ﬁrms in the steady state to engage in process innovation.
We then use this proposition to show that in response to a change in marginal trade costs,
∆log = ∆log =0and that the change on the constant in variable proﬁts is given by
(34). We then show, in Proposition 2, that the aggregate allocation of labor is unchanged
and that the ratio of indirect to direct eﬀects of changes in marginal trade costs on aggregate
productivity is given by (35).
Proposition 1. Consider a world economy with no ﬁxed costs of trade ( =0 ). In
this economy, a change in marginal trade costs  has no impact on the steady-state process
innovation decisions of ﬁrms, ()
Proof. We ﬁrst prove this proposition under the assumption that the economy is in
a symmetric steady-state equilibrium. With  =0for all ﬁrms, (20) implies that all ﬁrms
export and the variable proﬁts of a ﬁrm with productivity  are Π (1 + 1−)exp().H e n c e ,
under the assumption that all ﬁrms export, the Bellman equation in the steady state, (9), can
be written with ˜ Πexp() replacing Π (),w h e r e˜ Π = Π (1 + 1−). Our arguments in the
previous section imply that a unique level of ˜ Π exists which satisﬁes the free-entry condition
(11), independent of the parameter . The corresponding process innovation decisions that
solve the Bellman equation at this level of ˜ Π are the equilibrium exit and process innovation
decisions. These are also independent of .
In a steady-state equilibrium that is not symmetric, the appropriate deﬁnition of ˜ Π
is Π + Π1− and the same logic applies. Clearly, the analogous results hold for foreign
ﬁrms. QED.
Proposition 1 holds because, in an economy in which all ﬁrms export, the increased
incentives to innovate resulting from the increase in proﬁts that comes from a reduction in
marginal trade costs aﬀect all ﬁrms proportionally. The free-entry condition then requires
21that the increase in proﬁts be exactly oﬀset by an increase in the costs of the research good
necessary for innovation. Recalling that we have normalized the price of the research good to
1, we see that this is the intuition for the result that ˜ Π = Π (1 + 1−) remains unchanged.
So, too, does the optimal process innovation decision of all ﬁrms.12
Proposition 2. Consider a world economy with no ﬁxed costs of trade ( =0 ). In this
economy, in response to a change in marginal costs of trade , the aggregate labor allocation
 is unchanged, and the ratio of the indirect eﬀect to the direct eﬀect is given by (35). This
indirect eﬀect corresponds entirely to a change in product innovation.
Proof. We prove this proposition by calculating the terms in (33). From proposition
1, we know that ∆logΠ = −∆log(1 + 1−).S i n c ea l lﬁrms in this economy export, the
share of exports in intermediate goods’ output is equal to the export intensity of each ﬁrm,
which is given by 1−(1 + 1−). This gives (34). An immediate corollary of proposition
1 is that the ﬁrms’ exit decisions are also unchanged. Hence, the scaled distribution of ﬁrms
across states, ˜  (), the productivity indices,  and , and the ratio of total variable proﬁts
to total expenditures on research goods,  = Π [ + (1 + 1−)]Υ, remain unchanged.
From lemma 1,  is also unchanged. Our result follows from expression (33). QED.
Our proof follows from (33). That expression is a ﬁrst-order approximation of the
change in steady-state proﬁts (31); however, the result can be extended to the full nonlinear
model. Note also that if  =1 , product innovation is unchanged with a change in trade costs.
In this case, it is possible to prove proposition 2 without the use of the free-entry condition but
instead ﬁxing the number of ﬁrms in each country. One does require the free-entry condition
to prove our result when 1
B. No Productivity Dynamics
Now, consider a version of our model with ﬁxed operating and export costs, which assumes
that ∆ =0and with a time-invariant value of , so that it has no dynamics of ﬁrm
productivity or export decisions of active ﬁrms. In this version of our model, ﬁrms choose
not to engage in process innovation; hence, this model corresponds to the one in Melitz (2003).
In proving the next proposition 3, we establish that the ratio of indirect to direct eﬀects on
12Given this intuition, in our model when all ﬁrms export, ﬁrm-level process innovation decisions are also
unaﬀected by a country moving from autarky to free trade or by changes in tariﬀso rt a xr a t e so nﬁrm
proﬁts, revenues, or factor use that alter the variable proﬁt function in the same weakly separable manner
with  P r o p o s i t i o n1w o u l da l s oh o l di nat w o - s e c t o rm o d e li nw h i c ht h ea g g r e g a t eo u t p u t so fe a c hs e c t o r
are imperfect substitutes and ﬁrms face separate entry conditions of the form (11).
22aggregate productivity from a change in marginal trade costs is given by (35) for this version
of our model as well.
Proposition 3. In a symmetric steady-state equilibrium of our model with ∆ =0 ,a
time-invariant value of ,a n d → 1,t oaﬁrst-order approximation, the ratio of the indirect
eﬀect to the direct eﬀect of a change in marginal trade costs  on aggregate productivity is
given by (35).
Proof. Because  → 1, lemma 2 applies in this version of our model, so  remains
unchanged when marginal trade costs change. Because this model has no dynamics in pro-
ductivity or export decisions, active ﬁrms’ value functions in the steady-state equilibrium











.( 3 6 )
The free-entry condition is still (11). Because continuing without proﬁts has no option value,
ﬁrms exit if they draw an initial productivity  that yields a ﬁrm’s static proﬁts in the
domestic market less than zero, Π exp()  . Likewise, ﬁrms choose to export only if
the static proﬁts associated with doing so are positive, Π exp()1−  .U s i n g t h e s e
results to diﬀerentiate the free-entry condition (11) gives (34). The details of this derivation
are provided in the Appendix. Proposition 3 is obtained from plugging this last expression
into (33). QED.
Again, note that if  =1 , so that the research good is produced entirely with la-
bor, then a change in marginal trade costs has no indirect eﬀect on aggregate productivity.
Any increase in aggregate productivity which results from changes in ﬁrms’ exit and export
d e c i s i o n si se x a c t l yo ﬀset by a decline in product innovation.
The key intuition for this proposition is that, in the absence of productivity dynamics,
there are no option values associated with the decisions of exiting and exporting, and the
marginal ﬁrms earn zero current proﬁts from those two activities. Hence, at the margin,
changes in the exit and export decisions have no ﬁrst-order eﬀects on an entering ﬁrm’s ex-
pected proﬁts in the steady state. With  → 1, the aggregate allocation of labor remains
unchanged. All this implies that the ratio of indirect to direct eﬀects on aggregate produc-
tivity is the same here as in the version of the model in which all ﬁrms export. Hence, as
long as the ﬁxed and marginal trade costs are chosen to match the same share of exports in
the output of intermediate goods, the response of aggregate productivity in the steady state
23to a given percentage change in marginal trade costs is the same, whether all ﬁrms export or
not.
Note that in proposition 3, we rely on the assumption that  → 1 in order to use
lemma 2 to show that  is independent of . This lemma does not apply when 1 and
not all ﬁrms export. We can extend proposition 3 to allow for 1 as follows. Consider
the same version of the model with ∆ =0and a time-invariant level of . Suppose that,
in addition, the productivity distribution of entering ﬁrms  is such that the distribution
of exp() is Pareto (as in the work of Arkolakis et al. 2008, 2010, Baldwin and Robert-
Nicoud 2008, and Chaney 2008). In the online Appendix we show that in this case  is also
unchanged with , and the ratio of the indirect to the direct eﬀect of a change in marginal
trade costs  on aggregate productivity is also given by (35).
C. Exogenous Selection
Now, we consider the responses of ﬁrm process and product innovation and aggregate pro-
ductivity to a reduction in the costs of international trade in a version of the model with
productivity dynamics when not all ﬁrms export. We do so in a version of our model in
which ﬁrms’ exit and export decisions are exogenous. Here, a change in marginal trade costs
results in a reallocation of process innovation across ﬁrms. This reallocation is a portion of
the indirect eﬀect of a change in marginal trade costs on productivity that is not present
in the two earlier cases, when all ﬁrms export or when there are no productivity dynamics.
Despite this reallocation of process innovation, we show that (35) still applies.
In this version of our model, we assume that the ﬁxed costs of operating  equal
zero and that the ﬁxed costs of exporting, , follow a two-state Markov process in which
 ∈ {},w i t h =0and  = ∞, with a Markov transition matrix
Γ =
⎛
⎝  1 − 
1 −  
⎞
⎠
with  ≥ 12 and  ≥ 12.A l l e n t e r i n g ﬁrms start with productivity  =0 ,a n dw i t h
probability  they have  =  for  = . With these assumptions, ﬁrms’ exit and export
decisions are exogenous and independent of current productivity . This feature of the equi-
librium of this version of our model is what makes it analytically tractable. We refer to our
model with these parameters as the exogenous-selection v e r s i o no fo u rm o d e l .
24Lemma 3. In a symmetric steady-state equilibrium in the exogenous-selection version
of our model, the ﬁrms’ value functions  () have the form  exp() for  = ,a n dt h e





− ()+ (1 − ) [ +( 1− )],
 = Π − ()+ (1 − ) [ +( 1− )],
 ∈ arg max
∈[01]
− ()+ (1 − ) [ +( 1− )−] for  = ,( 3 7 )
with  denoting the expected growth rate of productivity for continuing ﬁrms, given by
 =[  exp(∆)+( 1− )exp(−∆)].
In this symmetric steady state, we have  ≥ .
The value of Π is determined by the free-entry condition
 =  ( + ),( 3 8 )















⎠,w i t h ( 3 9 )
 =
⎛
⎝  (1 − )
 (1 − ) 
⎞
⎠.
The aggregates values of ,  , , , ,a n d are the solutions to (6), (25), (26), (27),
(28), and (29), with
Υ =  + () + ().
Proof. The characterization of the value functions follows because ﬁrms never pay ﬁxed
costs of operating or exporting, so these ﬁxed costs drop out of the Bellman equation (9). It
follows immediately that the value functions and process innovation decisions which we put
forward solve that Bellman equation. Observe that    because  ≥ 12,  ≥ 12,a n d
251+1−  0. Then, since (·) is convex, from (37) we have that  ≥ , with this inequality
strict if  ∈ (01). The intuition for this result is straightforward. Exporters have a bigger
market. Because the exporting status is persistent, they also expect to have a bigger market
in the future. Hence, they have a greater incentive to innovate.
The aggregate productivity indices of equation (39) can be understood as follows. A
fraction  of ﬁrms exit exogenously every period. All continuing exporters have an expected
productivity growth rate of . A fraction  of these ﬁrms remain exporters, and a fraction
(1 − ) become non-exporters. Likewise, all continuing non-exporters have an expected
productivity growth rate of  and a transition of export status determined by .A l l
entering ﬁrms have a productivity index  =0and, hence, productivity of 1. A fraction  of
these entrants are exporters, and the remainder are non-exporters. QED.
We now study the impact of a reduction in trade costs in this economy. From the free-
entry condition (38), we see that a reduction in trade costs must raise the value of exporting
ﬁrms, , and lower the value of non-exporting ﬁrms, . If export status is suﬃciently
persistent, then the incentives for process innovation, captured in (37), increase for exporters
and decrease for non-exporters, leading to a reallocation of process innovation across ﬁrms.
We can obtain analytical results regarding the impact of the reduction in trade costs
on aggregate productivity in this special case of our model if we assume  → 1.
Proposition 4. In a symmetric steady state in the exogenous-selection version of our
model with  → 1,t oaﬁrst-order approximation, the ratio of the indirect eﬀect to the direct
eﬀect on aggregate productivity of a change in marginal trade costs  is given by (35).
Proof. We obtain this result regarding a change in marginal trade costs by diﬀeren-
tiating the Bellman equation and the free-entry condition to obtain the steady-state change
in proﬁts, and then we obtain the result from (33). In particular, diﬀerentiating the Bellman









+( 1− ) [∆ +( 1− )∆] and
∆ = ∆Π +( 1− ) [∆ +( 1− )∆],
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e da ne n v e l o p ec o n d i t i o nt oc a n c e lo u tt h et e r m st h a ta r i s ef r o mm a r g i n a l









⎝ (1 + 1−)∆Π + Π∆(1 + 1−)
∆Π
⎞
⎠.( 4 0 )
Free entry requires that
∆ + ∆ =0 .
Together, the last two expressions and the fact that [1 − (1 − )0]
−1 =
¡
























where the last equality follows from (39). This then implies (34). Proposition 4 is obtained
by plugging (34) into (33) and taking into account that  is independent of .Q E D .
From proposition 4, observe that if  =1  then there is no indirect eﬀect of a reduction
in trade costs on aggregate productivity in the steady state. Hence, in this case, the impact of
the change in process innovation on the productivity of the average ﬁrm must be exactly oﬀset
by the change in product innovation. More generally, recall that the impact of a change in
trade costs on process innovation is independent of the parameter . In equilibrium, product
innovation is what must adjust diﬀerently depending on the parameter .
We now discuss how the results of proposition 4 vary if 1 in the model with exoge-
nous selection. For this analysis, it is useful to deﬁne hybrid indices of aggregate productivity,
















⎠.( 4 2 )
Note that in these deﬁnitions, we use expression (39), where the eﬀective survival rate is
 (1 − ) instead of (1 − ). The hybrid share of exports in intermediate good output, ˜ ,
is deﬁned by expression (23), with ˜  and ˜  in place of  and . This hybrid share of
exports in intermediate good output corresponds to the share of exports in the discounted
27present value of revenues for an entering ﬁrm. If  =1 ,w eh a v et h a t˜  = .I f1,a n d
if entering ﬁrms are less (or more) likely to be exporters relative to old surviving ﬁrms, then
  ˜  (or   ˜ ).
Following the same logic as in proposition 4, we can show that





(Direct Eﬀect).( 4 3 )
Note that if entering ﬁrms are likely to be non-exporters (low ) and if export status is
persistent, then ˜  is close to zero and aggregate variable proﬁts Π are roughly unchanged
with . Then (37) implies that process innovation by exporters will increase much more
than that by non-exporters. In contrast, if entering ﬁrms are likely to be exporters (high )
then ˜  is high and Π falls by more with . This larger decline in aggregate variable proﬁts
leads to a smaller increase in process innovation by exporting ﬁrms than non-exporting ﬁrms.
Hence, the average export status of entering ﬁrms will largely determine the reallocation of
process innovation in response to a change in trade costs.
The result (43) raises the possibility that the indirect eﬀect on aggregate productivity
of a change in trade costs could oﬀset, rather than amplify, the direct eﬀect. In particular,
if process innovation is assumed to be highly inelastic, then ∆log = ∆log =0 . Then,


















.( 4 4 )
The indirect eﬀect is negative when ˜  is small and  is large. For example, if  =1 ,t h e n
the indirect eﬀect is negative if and only if ˜   .
D. Transition Dynamics
So far, we have focused on steady-state comparisons. We can also compute transitions in our
model out of the steady state, although to take into account all of the general equilibrium
eﬀects, we must do that numerically. In our quantitative analysis in the next section, we ﬁnd
that this model can have very slow transition dynamics even though the only state variable
is the distribution of productivities across ﬁrms. We can here gain some intuition for this
result in advance, however, by considering equation (39) in the exogenous-selection version
of the model, interpreted as a ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equation for the aggregate productivity
indices  and .
28That equation implies that if , ,a n d change once and for all after a onetime
change in trade costs in period 0, then the transition dynamics of the aggregate productivity
indices are given by
⎛
⎝  − ¯ 
 − ¯ 
⎞




⎝ 0 − ¯ 
0 − ¯ 
⎞
⎠,( 4 5 )
where ¯  and ¯  denote the new steady-state values of these indices. Note that  is a
matrix with all non-negative elements and that in order to have a steady state, (1 − )
 
must converge to zero. If that happens rapidly, then the transition dynamics are fast. If
(1 − )
  dies out slowly, then the transition dynamics are slow.
This matrix (1 − ) also determines in our model the productivity of the average
ﬁrm relative to that of the average entering ﬁrms. On average, entering ﬁrms have productiv-
ity [(1 + 1−)1 ] [  ]
0, and the average ﬁrm has productivity [(1 + 1−)1 ]
P∞
=0 (1 − )

 [ ]
0. Hence, if (1 − )
  dies out rapidly, then the productivity of the average ﬁrm
is similar to the average productivity of an entering ﬁrm. Here, process innovation is not
playing a big role in determining ﬁrms’ productivities, and transition dynamics are fast. In
contrast, if (1 − )
  dies out slowly, so that the productivity of the average ﬁrm is sub-
stantially larger than the average productivity of an entering ﬁrm, then process innovation
is playing a big role in determining ﬁrms’ productivities, but the transition dynamics are
slow. Our model thus has a trade-oﬀ between the importance of process innovation for ﬁrms’
productivities and the speed of transition to the steady state.
E. Extensions
In this section, we have derived our analytic results under three special cases of our model.
Before turning to our quantitative results, we brieﬂy discuss how to extend these results to
consider asymmetric countries, the impact of changes in trade costs on aggregate produc-
tivity as measured in the data (as opposed to our ideal measure of productivity), and the
introduction of growth into the model.
Asymmetric countries. In the online Appendix, we extend our analytic results to the
version of the model with asymmetric countries under the special cases discussed above and
 → 1.W eﬁrst show that, if we assume trade balance between countries, then to a ﬁrst-order
approximation, the ratio of the indirect eﬀect to the direct eﬀect of a change in marginal trade
29costs on steady-state aggregate productivity in each country is the same as with symmetric
countries, and given by (35). As we show in the online Appendix, with asymmetric countries
a new “terms of trade eﬀect” arises in our comparative statics that is not present in the
symmetric case.
To obtain the result above in the asymmetric case, we must include this terms of trade
eﬀe c ta sp a r to ft h ed i r e c te ﬀect of a change in trade costs on aggregate productivity. In
contrast to the symmetric case, the magnitude of the direct eﬀect of a change in marginal trade
costs can potentially diﬀer across our alternative model speciﬁcations because of this terms
of trade eﬀect. Hence, in general, the steady-state change in aggregate productivity, output,
and consumption in each country does not remain unchanged across model speciﬁcations as
in our model with symmetric countries.
We show, however, that with trade balance, to a ﬁrst-order approximation, the growth
of world output and consumption (deﬁn e da sa ne x p e n d i t u r e - w e i g h t e da v e r a g eo ft h eg r o w t h
of output and consumption of individual countries) is equal across model speciﬁcations if
these models are parameterized to match the same initial shares of trade and relative country
sizes. Hence, even though changes in exit, export, and process innovation decisions can
lead to diﬀerent responses of steady-state output and consumption in individual countries,
changes in these decisions do not aﬀect the global growth in output and consumption. That
is, changes in these decisions can lead to a redistribution of output and consumption across
countries, but not to changes in world output and consumption.13
Measured productivity. Throughout the paper, we focus on the impact of a change in
trade costs on an ideal measure of aggregate productivity. One extension of our work is to
consider the impact of a change in trade costs on aggregate productivity as it is measured in
the data. To carry out this extension, one would have to confront several important questions
about the correspondence between the elements of our model and these elements in the data.
To begin, note that if all diﬀerentiated products in our model correspond to intermedi-
13In the online Appendix, we also consider a version of our model that does not assume trade balance,
but instead assumes risk sharing between countries. The equilibrium allocations coincide with those of
the planning problem. We show that, to a ﬁrst-order approximation, the steady-state growth of world
consumption is also equal across our alternative model speciﬁcations. Moreover, in this case our measure of
aggregate consumption growth is equal to the steady-state change in welfare of a global planner. Hence, to
a ﬁrst-order approximation, changes in exit, export, and process innovation decisions of ﬁrms in response to
c h a n g e si nt r a d ec o s t sd on o ta ﬀect global welfare, once changes in product innovation and terms of trade are
taken into account.
30ate goods used in the production of ﬁnal goods in the data (so that changes in the price level
for ﬁnal expenditures, ∆log, can be directly measured using prices of ﬁnal goods) and if
 → 1, then the change in our ideal measure of aggregate productivity ∆log corresponds to
the change in aggregate productivity as measured using standard procedures in the data. To
see this, note that aggregate productivity in the data would be given by  (where  can
be measured as ﬁnal expenditures deﬂated by the price level for ﬁnal expenditures), while our
ideal measure of aggregate productivity is given by ( − ). With our result in lemma
2t h a ta s → 1 the ratios  and ( − ) both converge to constants independent of
trade costs , the change in  is equal to the change in ( − ).14
I fi n s t e a dw ea s s u m et h a ts o m eo ra l lo ft h ed i ﬀerentiated products in our model are
consumed directly as ﬁnal goods, then the problem of measuring changes in the price level
for ﬁnal expenditures, ∆log, becomes much more complicated. Here one has to confront
the standard problems that arise from changes in the variety of consumed goods (including
product substitution and the lack of a love for variety term in standard price indices). One has
to also confront the question of whether changes in trade costs are included in measured prices
o fe x p o r t e da n di m p o r t e dp r o d u c t s ,a n dw h e t h e rc h a n g e si nm e a s u r e dp r i c e sr e ﬂect changes
in cost or quality. As is standard, the ﬁrm-level productivity index exp() in our model can
be reinterpreted as a measure of the ﬁrm’s product quality. Under this interpretation, all
of our results remain unchanged, but our model’s implications on aggregate productivity do
change if measured changes in prices do not accurately reﬂect changes in product quality due
to changes in ﬁrms’ process innovation decisions.
If 1, additional problems with measuring productivity arise. In this case, the ratios
 and ( − )do change with changes in marginal trade costs, and hence changes in
our ideal measure of productivity do not correspond to productivity as measured in the data.
These diﬀerences between measured and ideal productivity arise as a result of the standard
problem that expenditure on innovation is typically expensed instead of being included as a
part of ﬁnal output, so that  and  are not accurately measured.
A full analysis of the impact of these factors on the measurement of aggregate produc-
tivity is outside of the scope of this paper (see Bajona et al. [2008] for a discussion of related
14This result follows if in the data, either (i) all expenditures on innovation are expensed instead of being
counted as ﬁnal output (so that ﬁnal expenditures are equal to ), or (ii) all research output is measured as
ﬁnal expenditures (so that measured ﬁnal expenditures are equal to + + , which is proportional
to  when  → 1).
31issues).
Growth. In our analysis, we have abstracted from spillovers and made the assumption on
parameters that  + 2 so that our model has a steady state with no ongoing growth
through process and product innovation. Thus, in this speciﬁcation of our model, changes in
marginal trade costs can aﬀect only the level of aggregate productivity in the steady state.
This is because of the negative relationship between aggregate productivity and ﬁrm prof-
itability captured in (31). Intuitively, competition implies that if the productivity of all other
ﬁrms rises, in equilibrium, the proﬁtability of a ﬁrm with a ﬁxed level of productivity falls.
This negative relationship rules out continuous growth in aggregate productivity because
eventually, such growth makes both process and product innovation unproﬁtable.
It is straightforward to extend our model to include exogenous growth driven either
through labor-augmenting technical change (increasing the eﬀective stock of labor )o r
through improvements in the productivity of entrants (shifts in the distribution ), as in
Luttmer (2007a). The impact of such growth on our analysis is to change the steady-state
real interest rate. Otherwise, the mathematics of our model solution are unchanged.
Under alternative assumptions, our model can be related to existing models with
endogenous growth – in particular the “Lab Equipment" model as described in Acemoglu
(2009), chapter 13, and the “Quality Ladders" model of Grossman and Helpman (1991)
applied to ﬁrms by Klette and Kortum (2004). For example, in our model if  +  =
2 then there exists a balanced growth path with endogenous growth through continuous
expansion of the number of ﬁrms. In terms of our argument above, under the assumption
that + =2 , then, from (31), we see that there is no longer a negative relationship between
the ﬁrm proﬁtability and aggregate productivity. Hence, continuous expansion of aggregate
productivity through growth in the number of ﬁrms is consistent with constant proﬁtability
of a ﬁrm with ﬁxed level of productivity and hence is consistent with free entry. Thus,
this speciﬁcation of our model has endogenous growth similar to that in the Lab Equipment
model.
An alternative and complementary approach to generating endogenous growth in our
model is to include spillovers. In particular, if we maintain the assumption that +2 so
that the proﬁtability of a given ﬁrm falls when aggregate productivity rises, then, to preserve
free entry with growth, we need a spillover from average productivity to the productivity
of new ﬁrms. Note, however, that in percentage terms, the spillover must be 100 percent
32to allow for ongoing growth – the ratio of the expected productivity of a new ﬁrm to the
productivity of the average ﬁrm must remain constant over time. The Quality Ladders model
assumes such a spillover to generate growth in the average productivity of ﬁrms (see Luttmer
[2007a] for a related model with such a spillover).
We leave considerations of the impact of changes in trade costs on aggregate productiv-
ity and growth in such models for future work. Given the work of Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud
(2008) on the role of spillovers in the Melitz model, we expect that our model could generate
a wide variety of results depending on the details of the spillovers.
V. Quantitative Analysis
We now present a quantitative version of our baseline model to extend our results from the
previous section on the impact of a change in the marginal costs of international trade on
aggregate productivity and welfare to speciﬁcations of the model that we cannot solve for
analytically. In particular, we consider a speciﬁcation of our model with both endogenous
selection in ﬁrms’ exit and export decisions and potentially elastic process innovation. We
also consider the impact of assuming positive interest rates and large changes in marginal
trade costs on our results. We parameterize our quantitative model to make it consistent
with some salient features of U.S. data on ﬁrm size dynamics (in terms of both employment
and export status) and ﬁrm size distribution.15
We then conduct four experiments with our parameterized model to consider the
impact of various assumptions on our results. In our ﬁrst experiment, we ﬁnd, quantitatively,
that, with zero interest rates, the response of aggregate productivity to a small change in
trade costs, measured as an elasticity, is quite close to what we found analytically above. We
then consider the impact of our assumption of zero interest rates in our next two experiments.
In our second experiment, we consider a speciﬁcation of our quantitative model with positive
interest rates and inelastic process innovation. This speciﬁcation of our model extends the
model of Melitz (2003) in allowing for both (exogenous) productivity dynamics and positive
interest rates. We ﬁnd that the response of aggregate productivity in this speciﬁcation of
our quantitative model is quite close to our analytical results. In our third experiment, we
consider a speciﬁcation of our quantitative model with positive interest rates and elastic
process innovation. Here we ﬁnd that it is possible to have a larger steady state response of
aggregate productivity than we have found in our previous analytical and quantitative results.
15The online Appendix provides many details on our solution method and calibration.
33In this experiment, however, it remains the case that the reallocation of process innovation
toward exporting ﬁrms and the adjustment of product innovation have largely oﬀsetting
eﬀects on aggregate productivity. In particular, the responses of average productivity and
product innovation are both at least an order of magnitude larger than the response of
aggregate productivity. We also show in this experiment that this reallocation of innovation
has a small impact on welfare because the transition dynamics to the new steady state are
so slow. Finally, in our fourth experiment, we ﬁnd that when we allow for larger changes in
international trade costs, our conclusions from our third experiment are roughly unchanged.
A. Calibration
Table 1 lists all of our benchmark parameters. We choose time periods equal to two months
so there are six time periods per year. As we reduce the period length, we keep the entry
period of new ﬁrms at one year. We parameterize the distribution  of productivity draws
and the export costs of entrants, so that all ﬁrms enter with a common productivity index
0 =0and all ﬁrms share a level of ﬁxed costs of exporting  that is constant throughout
the ﬁrm’s active life.16
We assume that the process innovation cost function has the form ()=exp(),s o
that the curvature of this function is indexed by the parameter  If this curvature parameter
 is high (or low), then process innovation is highly inelastic (or elastic) to changes in the
incentives to innovate. We consider alternative values of this curvature  ranging from a very
large value ( =1 200), in which the process innovation decisions of ﬁrms are highly inelastic
and, hence, eﬀectively constant, as in the model of Luttmer (2007a), to lower values ( =3 0
and 10) in which process innovation decisions are elastic, so that the reallocation of process
innovation after a trade cost change is quite large.
The remaining parameters of the model are chosen to reproduce a number of salient
features of U.S. data on ﬁrm dynamics, the ﬁrm size distribution, and international trade. The
parameters that we must choose are the steady-state real interest rate 1 the total number
of workers  the parameters governing the variance of employment growth for surviving ﬁrms
∆, the exogenous exit rate of ﬁrms , the marginal trade costs ,t h eﬁxed costs of operation
 and entry ,t h eﬁxed costs of exporting , and the parameters of the innovation cost
16In this case, the state variable  takes at most a countable number of values, all integer multiples of ∆.
The distribution  () is now the mass of ﬁrms in the home country with state (), and integrals over
 are replaced by sums over .
34function  and . We also need to choose the elasticity of substitution across intermediate
goods in ﬁnal output  and the share of labor in the production of research goods .I no u r
model, the distribution of employment across ﬁrms in a symmetric steady state depends on
the elasticity parameter  only through the trade intensity for ﬁrms that do export, given
by 1−(1 +1−) Much of our calibration procedure is based on employment data, so we
choose 1− as a parameter; hence, our steady-state calibration is invariant to the choice of
 For similar reasons, our steady-state calibration is also invariant to the choice of .
These parameters are set as follows. We consider two values of :  =1 ,s ot h a tt h e
interest rate is zero, and  set so that the steady-state interest rate (annualized) is 5 percent.
We normalize the number of workers  =1 . Several parameters shape the law of motion of
ﬁrm productivity  (∆, , , ,  1−, ,a n d). We choose ∆ so that the standard
deviation of the growth rate of employment of large ﬁrms in the model is 25 percent on an
annualized basis. This ﬁgure is in the range of those for US publicly traded ﬁrms, as reported
by Davis et al. (2007).17 We choose the exogenous exit rate  so that the model’s annual
employment-weighted exit rate of large ﬁrms is 055 percent, which is consistent with that
rate for large ﬁrms in the U.S. data.18 Note that in our model, over the course of one year,
large ﬁrms do not choose to exit endogenously because they have productivity far away from
the threshold productivity for exit. Hence,  determines the annual exit rate of these ﬁrms
directly. We normalize entry costs  =1 , and we set the ﬁxed costs of operation  =0 1.19
Corresponding to each value of the curvature parameter ,w ec h o o s et h ep a r a m e t e r s
 1−,a n d to match three observations: (1) the fraction of exports in the gross output
of intermediate goods is  =7 5 percent; (2) the fraction of total production employment
accounted for by exporting ﬁrms is (1 + 1−)1− =4 0percent;20 (3) the shape of
the right tail of the ﬁrm size distribution matches that in the United States. Here, our
calibration procedure is similar to that of Luttmer (2007a). Speciﬁcally, we represent the
right tail of the distribution of employment across ﬁrms in the U.S. data with a function that
17We abstract from the trend in employment growth rate volatility discussed by Davis et al. (2007) and
pick a number that roughly matches the average for the period 1980—2001.
18This is the 1997—2002 average employment-based failure rate of U.S. ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et h a n5 0 0e m p l o y e e s ,
computed using the Statistics of U.S. Businesses, available online at http://www.sba.gov.
19The statistics that we report are invariant to proportional changes in all three ﬁxed costs and 
20Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2008) report that the fraction of total U.S. employment (excluding a few
sectors such as agriculture, education, and public services) accounted for by exporters is 363 percent in 1993
and 394 percent in 2000. The average of exports and imports to gross output for the comparable set of
sectors is roughly 75 percent in the United States in 2000. The steady state of our model abstracts from
trends in trade costs that would lead to changes in trade volumes over time.
35maps the logarithm of the number of employees log() into the logarithm of the fraction of
total employment in ﬁrms this size or larger. This function is known to be close to linear for
large ﬁrms. In calibrating the model with inelastic process innovation (ﬁxed  for all ﬁrms),
we set the model parameters so that the model matches the slope coeﬃcient of this function
for ﬁrms within a certain size range.21 To be concrete, we target a slope of −02 for ﬁrms
ranging between 1000 and 5000 employees.
Note that ﬁrm sizes in terms of number of employees in the model are simply a nor-
malization. We choose this normalization so that the median ﬁrm in the employment-based
size distribution is of size 500.I no t h e rw o r d s ,50 percent of total employment in the model is
accounted for by ﬁrms with fewer than 500 employees.22 The calibrated model then implies
a value of process innovation  for large ﬁrms. As we lower the curvature parameter ,w e
adjust the model parameters to keep the value of  for large ﬁrms constant and thus keep the
dynamics of large ﬁrms unchanged.
Table 1 summarizes the numbers used in the calibration, as well as the resulting
parameter values, for each level of the curvature parameter .R e c a l lt h a tb yc a l i b r a t i n gt h e
m o d e lt od a t ao nﬁrm size, we do not need to take a stand on the values of  and .T h e
aggregate implications of changes in trade costs are, however, aﬀected by those values. In
our benchmark parameterization, we set  =5and  equal to either 1 or 05.23
B. Experiment 1: Interest Rate Zero, Process Innovation Elasticity Varying
In our ﬁrst experiment, we consider the calibration of our model in which the interest rate is 0
percent and the elasticity of process innovation varies. This calibration of our model combines
the endogenous selection of ﬁrms’ exit and export decisions of the Melitz (2003) model with
the productivity dynamics driven by endogenous process innovation. Since the interest rate
is zero, we know from lemma 1 that the aggregate allocation of labor does not change. In
this experiment, we evaluate the accuracy of (34) and (35) derived in our analytical results
of Section III. Here, as well as in experiments 2 and 3, we reduce marginal trade costs by
a small magnitude (∆log = −0005) and compute the change in the symmetric steady
21The slope coeﬃcient for suﬃciently large ﬁrms can be solved for analytically in our model. In particular,
given the choice of process innovation  for large ﬁrms, the slope coeﬃcient is 1+lo g()∆,w h e r e is the
root of  =( 1− ) +( 1− )(1− )2, which is less than 1 in absolute value.
22This is the size of the median ﬁrm in the U.S. ﬁrm employment-based size distribution on average in the
period 1999—2003, as reported by the Statistics of U.S. Businesses, available online at http://www.sba.gov.
23Our choice of  =5roughly coincides with the average elasticity of substitution for U.S. imports of
diﬀerentiated four-digit goods estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006) for the period 1990—2001.
36state of the model. We report all changes as elasticities (ratios of changes in the log of the
variables to ∆log) with a minus sign so that these elasticities can be interpreted as the
increase in aggregate productivity, output, and so on in response to a decline in trade costs.
We repeat these experiments for our three curvature parameters of the process innovation
cost function (high, moderate, and low), and our two values of  ( =1and 05) for a total
of six parameter conﬁgurations of the model. Results are reported in Table 2.
Since the share of exports in intermediate good output is  =0 075 and  =5 ,i ti s
clear that for all six of these cases, our analytical formula (34) is very accurate. When  =1
(in columns 1—3 in Table 2), our formula (35) for the ratio of the indirect eﬀect to the direct
eﬀect is also quite accurate. In this case, the indirect eﬀect is roughly zero because product
innovation adjusts to oﬀset the changes in exit, export, and process innovation. This implies
that the aggregate changes in aggregate productivity in these three cases are close to changes
from the direct eﬀect alone.
Note that when process innovation is elastic, there is a large reallocation of process
innovation from non-exporters to exporters. This reallocation leads to a large change in the
share of exports in output. In particular, the elasticity of the export share  to a change
in  is 37 with high curvature of the process innovation cost function, 10 with moderate
curvature, and 267 with low curvature. (We do not report these numbers in Table 2.) This
reallocation leads to a large increase in the productivity of the average ﬁrm (its elasticity is
roughly 0 with high curvature, 117 with moderate curvature, and 388 with low curvature).
However, in each case, a large oﬀsetting movement in product innovation leaves the indirect
eﬀect of a reduction in marginal trade costs on aggregate productivity roughly unchanged.
For those cases in Table 2 with  =0 5 (columns 4—6), the conclusions are similar
in that the numerical results are close to the analytical predictions. Here the change in
aggregate productivity is larger (0086 instead of 0075) because the indirect eﬀect is larger,
as predicted by (35).
From lemma 2, we have that when the interest rate is zero, a change in trade costs does
not aﬀect the steady-state change ratio of consumption to output. This result is conﬁrmed
in Table 2: the response of aggregate consumption in this experiment is the same as that of
aggregate output.
C. Experiment 2: Interest Rate Positive, Process Innovation Inelastic
In our second experiment, we consider the parameterization of our model in which the annual-
37ized interest rate is 5 percent and process innovation is inelastic (i.e., there is a high curvature
of the process innovation cost function). This version of the model is the one discussed at the
end of the analytic section, extended with endogenous selection in exit and export decisions.
We perform the same aggregate exercises here as in experiment 1, using values of  equal to
1 and 05, and report the results in Table 3.
We ﬁnd that with these changes, the formulas for the change in the constant in variable
proﬁts, (43), and the ratio of the indirect to the indirect eﬀects, (44), are very accurate. Our
main ﬁnding from this experiment is that, with a small value of ˜ , the indirect eﬀect of
a reduction in marginal trade costs is negative. That is, the decline in product innovation
more than oﬀsets the changes in the productivity of the average ﬁrm. Hence, the resulting
change in aggregate productivity is smaller than that arising from the direct eﬀect alone.
In particular, the direct eﬀect on aggregate productivity is 0075, which is larger than the
resulting change in aggregate output reported in columns 1—2 in Table 3 (003 with  =1
and 0019 with  =0 5).
This result that the indirect eﬀect is negative is largely driven by the result that the
elasticity of variable proﬁts to a change in trade costs, as given by ( − 1) ˜ , is so small.
The intuition for this result is that entering ﬁrms start small, and they take many periods to
become exporters. Hence, with a positive interest rate, changes in marginal trade costs do
not have a signiﬁcant impact on the variable proﬁts of entering ﬁrms.
To illustrate the importance of ﬁrm dynamics for this result, consider an alternative
parameterization of our model in which the constant  in the process innovation cost function
is set to a higher level, so that entering ﬁrms on average do not grow substantially. In this al-
ternative parameterization,  and ˜  are both roughly equal to 0075. This parameterization
might be relevant for capturing productivity dynamics at the product level rather than at
the ﬁrm level if we think that new products enter at a relatively larger scale. In this parame-
terization, entering products are roughly the same size as the average ﬁrm and, hence, have
a relatively high probability of being exported shortly after entry. When we repeat experi-
ment 2 with this alternative parameterization of our model, we obtain the results reported in
columns 3 and 4 of Table 3. Compared to the ﬁrst parameterization results, here the change
in variable proﬁts is larger in absolute terms, and the indirect eﬀect is roughly zero or slightly
positive. In terms of the impact on aggregate productivity, these results are similar to those
we obtained in columns 1 and 4 of Table 2 with a zero interest rate. This result suggests
38that, quantitatively, the hybrid export share ˜  plays a large role in determining the eﬀects
of a change in marginal trade costs on aggregate productivity in the steady state.
D. Experiment 3: Interest Rate Positive, Process Innovation Elastic
In our third experiment, we consider a speciﬁcation of our model that is not close to one we
solved analytically. Exit and export decisions are endogenous, the annualized interest rate
is 5 percent and the values of the curvature parameter governing the elasticity of process
innovation are moderate ( =3 0 )a n dl o w(  =1 0 ). We report the results in Table 4.
We see in columns 1—4 that shifting to this parameterization produces a large realloca-
tion of labor (for example, the elasticity of aggregate production labor with a low curvature
of the process innovation cost function and  =1in column 2 is 029)a n dl e s so fa no ﬀset
of product innovation to the change in the productivity of the average ﬁrm (the ratio of the
indirect eﬀect to the direct eﬀect on productivity in column 2 is 026). From (31), we see
that both of these eﬀects can contribute to a substantial ampliﬁcation of the direct eﬀect of a
reduction in trade costs on output. The response of aggregate output is also large compared
to that seen in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3, which assumes inelastic process innovation. In
particular, if  =1 , then the elasticity of aggregate output to a reduction in  is 003 with
a high curvature of the process innovation cost function, 015 with moderate curvature, and
039 with low curvature. Thus, with a low curvature of the process innovation cost function,
the response of output is more than ﬁve times what would arise from the direct eﬀect alone.
Note, however, that there is still a substantial oﬀsetting eﬀect between process and product
innovation. The elasticity of the productivity of the average ﬁrm and the elasticity of product
innovation are both at least an order of magnitude larger than their combined eﬀect on aggre-
gate productivity. For example, with a low curvature of the process innovation cost function
and  =1in column 2 of Table 4, the elasticity of the productivity of the average ﬁrm is
266 and the elasticity of product innovation is −265, while that of aggregate productivity
is only 0095.
E. Welfare in Experiments 2—3
Our results so far concern the impact of a small change in marginal trade cost on steady-state
levels of aggregate productivity and output. Now, we ask whether considering ﬁrms’ decisions
to exit, export, and innovate substantially aﬀects the model’s implications for the eﬀects of
a change in trade costs on welfare.
39Our welfare metric is the equivalent variation in consumption from a change in mar-
ginal trade costs, deﬁned as the change in consumption at the old steady state that leaves
households indiﬀerent between the old steady state and the transition to the new steady
state. To ensure that our welfare measure is well deﬁned, we consider welfare only in those
speciﬁcations of our model with positive interest rates (1)
To put these welfare gains in perspective, we compare them to the magnitude of the
welfare gains from the same change in trade costs in a speciﬁcation of our model with only
product innovation. In particular, we use as a benchmark a speciﬁcation of our model in
which exit decisions are exogenous, all ﬁrms export, and process innovation is inelastic so
that there are no indirect eﬀects of a change in marginal trade costs on welfare arising from
changes in ﬁrms’ decisions on these margins. Therefore, by comparing the welfare gains in
our calibrated model to the welfare gains found in this benchmark speciﬁcation of our model,
we can determine the importance of changes in ﬁrms’ exit, export, and process innovation
decisions for welfare. We calibrate this benchmark speciﬁcation of our model to obtain the
same baseline share of exports in the output of intermediate goods.
Consider now the welfare implications of a small change in the marginal trade costs
in our model as speciﬁed in experiments 2 and 3. In Tables 3 and 4, we report the elasticity
of the equivalent variation in consumption with respect to ∆log for both our calibrated
model and our benchmark speciﬁcation.
I nb o t he x p e r i m e n t s2a n d3 ,a sr e p o r t e di nc o l u m n s1 — 4o fT a b l e s3a n d4 ,w es e e
that our welfare statistic is very similar in both speciﬁcations of our model. Hence, in these
experiments almost no eﬀects on welfare arise from the indirect eﬀects associated with changes
in ﬁrms’ exit, export, and process innovation decisions and the reallocation of aggregate labor
in the transition to a new steady state, despite the fact that both of these sources contribute
to a large change in aggregate output and consumption.
These results follow from the fact that when the steady-state response of aggregate
productivity and output to a change in marginal trade costs is large, the transition dynamics
are very slow and, hence, contribute little to welfare. To illustrate these slow transition
dynamics, we plot in Figure 1 the elasticity of the ratio of exports to output of intermediate
good ﬁrms during the transition. Note that the short-run increase in trade volumes as a
fraction of output is smaller than the steady-state change. As is evident in the ﬁgure, however,
when entering ﬁrms are small relative to the average ﬁrm, these transition dynamics take more
40than 100 years to play out. This is consistent with our analytical argument that our model’s
aggregate transition dynamics are connected to its ﬁrm dynamics. When entering ﬁrms are
small relative to the average ﬁrm, aggregate transition dynamics are slow.
When entering ﬁrms are larger, these dynamics are much faster. To illustrate this
point, we also show in Figure 1 the transition dynamics for exports relative to output of
intermediate good ﬁrms for the speciﬁcations of our model in which entering ﬁrms are large
relative to the average ﬁrm, as described in columns 5 and 6 of Table 4. In particular, in these
speciﬁcations, entering ﬁrms on average do not grow substantially, so the actual and hybrid
shares of employment in exporters are similar. We see that, for this speciﬁcation of our model,
the aggregate transition dynamics are substantially faster. Note, however, that despite the
faster transition dynamics, our welfare statistics are still roughly the same across speciﬁcations
of our model because, in the long run, the indirect eﬀect and the aggregate reallocation of
labor both contribute to only a small change in aggregate output and consumption.24
F. Experiment 4: Larger Trade Cost Change
Now we repeat experiments 2 and 3, but with a larger change in international trade costs.
In particular, using the same parameter values as in the earlier experiments, we compute the
welfare eﬀects that arise from a 35 percent reduction in  rather than from a very small
change.25
We report the results in Table 5. Depending on the elasticity of process innovation,
this large trade cost change results, in the long run, in an increase in the export share from
75 percent to 88 percent when the curvature of the process innovation cost function is high,
or to 167 percent when the curvature is low. Despite the large change in trade patterns
which comes from a reallocation of process innovation from non-exporters to exporters, there
24T h er e s u l tt h a tc o n s i d e r a t i o no fﬁrms’ exit, export, and process innovation decisions has a very small
impact on the welfare implications of a change in marginal trade costs can also be understood through the lens
of the planning solution of our model. As discussed above, the equilibrium allocations of our model coincide
with the planning solution under  =1 ,o ri f1 in the presence of a per-unit subsidy that eliminates
distortionary monopoly markups. In the planning problem, with ﬁrms’ exit, export, and process innovation
decisions optimally chosen, the envelope condition implies that, to a ﬁrst-order approximation, the increase
in the discounted ﬂow of utility from a change in marginal trade costs is equal to the discounted present
value of the direct eﬀect of this change on aggregate productivity. We know from the envelope condition that
changes in ﬁrms’ exit, export, and process innovation decisions are of higher than ﬁrst order for welfare.
25We choose this change in trade cost to ensure that our model still has a steady state with entry. Choosing
a larger reduction in  with a high curvature parameter of the process innovation cost function ( =1 0 )l e a d s
to an even larger increase in the growth rate of exporting ﬁrms and a nonstationary ﬁrm size distribution.
We also computed the welfare gains using a larger change in trade cost with a moderate curvature  =3 0
(i.e., a 15 percent reduction in ), and found similar results.
41is a large oﬀsetting response of product innovation. As reported in Table 5, the change
in the productivity of the average ﬁrm is at least one order of magnitude larger than the
change in aggregate productivity. Overall, the welfare gains that arise from the indirect
eﬀects associated with changes in ﬁrms’ exit, export, and process innovation decisions and
the reallocation of aggregate labor in the transition to a new steady state are not very diﬀerent
to our benchmark speciﬁcation in which all ﬁrms export and process innovation is inelastic.
For example, with  =1 , the welfare gains are 8 percent when all ﬁrms export and process
innovation is inelastic, and 88 percent when not all ﬁrms export and process innovation is
elastic with a low curvature of the process innovation cost function.
VI. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have built a model of endogenous change in aggregate productivity that
arises in general equilibrium as ﬁrms’ exit, export, process, and product innovation decisions
respond to a change in international trade costs. Our central ﬁnding is that, even though such
a trade cost change can have a substantial impact on individual ﬁrms’ decisions, that impact
is not reﬂected in aggregate welfare. In particular, the steady-state response of product
innovation largely oﬀsets the impact of changes in ﬁrms’ exit, export, and process innovation
decisions on our ideal measure of aggregate productivity. In our quantitative exercise, we
also ﬁnd that the dynamic welfare gains from a reduction in trade costs are not substantially
larger than those from simpler models that abstract from endogenous selection and process
innovation, even though changes in ﬁrms’ exit, export, and process innovation decisions lead
to very large dynamic responses of exports and the ﬁrm size distribution. Our results thus
suggest that microeconomic evidence on individual ﬁrms’ exit, export, and process innovation
responses to changes in international trade costs is not likely to be informative about the
macroeconomic implications of these changes for aggregate welfare.
Our model of ﬁrms’ process and product innovation decisions could be useful for gen-
erating new answers to long-standing questions in trade, such as what is the impact of glob-
alization on trade volumes and patterns of comparative advantage. We have shown that,
as long as only a subset of ﬁrms export, the magnitude and dynamics of these responses in
our model critically depend on the elasticity of process innovation to changes in trade costs
and the details of ﬁrm dynamics. Hence, microeconomic evidence on individual ﬁrms’ exit,
export, and process innovation responses to changes in international trade costs is likely to
be informative about the role of heterogeneous ﬁrm decisions in understanding the evolution
42of trade patterns.
Our model has abstracted from four important considerations that might aﬀect our
ﬁndings. First, we have assumed a continuum of ﬁrms with constant elasticity of demand,
which implies that changes in trade costs have no impact on ﬁrms’ markups and that process
innovation decisions do not strategically interact across ﬁrms. Our model could be extended to
allow for variable markups. (For a model of trade and heterogeneous ﬁrms with nonconstant
elasticity of demand, see the work of Melitz and Ottaviano [2008]. For models of process
innovation with strategic interactions between ﬁrms, see those of Ericson and Pakes [1995]
and Aghion et al. [2001].)
Second, we have assumed that all ﬁrms produce only one good. In doing so, we
have ignored the eﬀects that a change in trade costs might have on product innovation by
incumbent ﬁrms. Consideration of process and product innovation in models with multi-
product ﬁrms would be an important extension of our work here. (For diﬀerent types of
models of multi-product ﬁrms, see the work of Klette and Kortum [2004], Luttmer [2007b],
and Bernard, Redding, and Schott [2009].)
Third, we have abstracted from spillover eﬀects that might lead to endogenous growth.
As we discussed above, we anticipate that one can generate a wide variety of results regarding
the impact of a reduction in trade costs on innovation depending on the details of spillovers.
Fourth, we have abstracted from multiple factors of production such as skilled and
unskilled labor. There is a growing literature that examines the impact of trade on the
incentives of ﬁrms to engage in skilled-biased innovation and its eﬀects on the skill premium
(e.g., Acemoglu 2003; Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen 2009; and Thoenig and Verdier 2003).
In an extension of our model including multiple factors and goods, a reduction in trade costs
can lead to a reallocation of innovative activities across sectors and countries that can shape
the response of the skill premium.
Appendix A
Derivations and Proofs
Aggregate Variables in the Symmetric Steady State
Here we derive the equations deﬁning the aggregate variables in the symmetric steady
state. The deﬁnition of the price index of the ﬁnal good in the home country (4) implies that


















+ .( A 1 )
From (25) and (A1), aggregate output is given by (26). From (6) and (25), the resource
















−1 .( A 2 )
From (7), the constant on variable proﬁts (18) in a symmetric steady state is given by (28).
Using (25) and (26), the constant on variable proﬁts can be written as
Π =

 (1 − )
1−











−1 ( − ).( A 3 )
Pre-multiplying (A3) by  ( +( 1+1−)), dividing this expression by (A2), and re-
arranging terms, we obtain (27), the employment used to produce the research good.
We also know, from (13), that  =  −,o rf r o m( 6 ) ,t h a t =  − [(1 − )]().
Using (25), (26), and (27), we obtain (29). Note that 0 ≤  ≤  , because  ≥ 1 and 1.
QED.
Lemma 2. Here we prove lemma 2, which is introduced in Section III. The last two
lines in equation (16) deﬁne an operator that maps existing distributions of ﬁr m sa c r o s ss t a t e s
into new distributions of ﬁrms across states. We denote this operator by  and rewrite (16)
as
+1 =   + .
Hence, the steady-state distribution of ﬁrms across states, scaled by the measure of entering






This distribution is the sum of the ﬁrm distribution across those that are from  =0to
 = ∞ periods old.
Note that if we integrate our Bellman equation (9) as  → 1 (value functions are well
deﬁned as  → 1 because under our parameter restrictions, ﬁrms shrink in expectation), then
44with respect to any arbitrary distribution of ﬁr m sa c r o s ss t a t e s (),w eg e t

Z













Iterating on this expression, using  as the initial distribution in place of ,giv esthat

Z





























Reversing the order of summation and integration gives lemma 2. QED.
Proposition 3. Here we provide additional details for the proof proposition 3 in the
v e r s i o no fo u rm o d e lw i t h∆ =0and time-invariant ﬁxed export costs  so that there are
no dynamics in productivity or export decisions. To simplify our presentation, we assume
that there is a single (as well as time-invariant) value of , but our results carry through if
there are multiple levels of .
The steady-state value of a ﬁrm with productivity , allowing for 1,i sg i v e nb y
 ()=
1
1 −  (1 − )
max
©





.( A 4 )
The free-entry condition is

Z
 () ()d =  ,
where () is the density of the productivity of entering ﬁrms and ¯ () is the corresponding
45cumulative distribution function.
The exit cutoﬀ ¯  is deﬁned by Π exp(¯ )=,a n dt h ee x p o r tc u t o ﬀ ¯  by Π1− exp(¯ )=
. We assume, without loss of generality, that   −1, so that the export cutoﬀ is
strictly higher than the exit cutoﬀ.















1 − ¯ (¯ )
¤
 =
[1 −  (1 − )]

 ,( A 5 )





























exp(¯ ) (¯ )∆¯  =0 .














which results in (34).
The average expenditures on the research good per entering ﬁrm,Υ, from (24) are
Υ =  +
1 − ¯ (¯ )

 +
1 − ¯ (¯ )

.( A 6 )












.( A 7 )
If  → 1,t h e n = Π [ +  (1 + 1−)]Υ =1(which conﬁrms lemma 1). With lemma
2, that expression implies that  is unchanged with . Hence, the ratio of the indirect eﬀect
46to the direct eﬀect of changes in trade costs on aggregate productivity is given by (35). QED.
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  Exogenous exit rate, δ (annualized) 0.005 0.005 0.005
  Process innovation step size,  Δz (annualized) 0.25 0.25 0.25
  Level of process innovation cost function, h ‐ 3.3E‐09 0.00108
   (or employment‐based right‐tail coefficient of large firms) ( ‐0.25 )(  ‐0.25 )(  ‐0.25 )
  Marginal trade costs , D
(1‐ρ) 0.231 0.231 0.231
  Fixed costs of international trade, n x 1.4 0.7 0.285
Targets U.S. Data
  Employment growth rate of large firms 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
   (annual standard deviation)




  Exports / Gross Output (of intermediate goods in model) 0.075 0.075 0.076 0.075














  Curvature of process innovation cost function, b High Moderate Low High Moderate Low
  Export share, sx 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075
  Hybrid export share, 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075
Elasticity of Aggregate Variables across Steady States
  Negative of  (log change in variable / log change in D)
  Constant on variable profits, Πd ‐0.300 ‐0.301 ‐0.303 ‐0.300 ‐0.302 ‐0.303
  Aggregate productivity, Z 0.075 0.075 0.076 0.086 0.086 0.086
    Direct effect 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075
    Productivity of the average firm 0.008 1.174 3.885 0.008 1.175 3.885
    Product innovation ‐0.008 ‐1.176 ‐3.908 0.003 ‐1.166 ‐3.897
s ̃x
    Product innovation 0.008 1.176 3.908 0.003 1.166 3.897
  Aggregate production labor, L‐Lr 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
  Output, Y 0.075 0.075 0.076 0.086 0.086 0.086
  Consumption, C 0.075 0.075 0.076 0.086 0.086 0.086
  Ratio of indirect / direct effects, numerical 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.15 0.15
  Ratio of indirect / direct effects, theoretical 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.14TABLE 3
Experiment 2: Effects of a Small Reduction in Marginal Trade Costs, with Positive Interest Rate and Inelastic Process Innovation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
                    Small Entering Firms                     Large Entering Firms
λ=1 λ=0.5 λ=1 λ=0.5
Parameters
  Curvature of process innovation cost function, b High High High High
  Export share, sx 0.075 0.075 0.078 0.078
  Hybrid export share, 0.004 0.004 0.075 0.075
Elasticity of Aggregate Variables across Steady States
  Negative of  (log change in variable / log change in D)
  Constant on variable profits, Πd ‐0.017 ‐0.017 ‐0.301 ‐0.301
  Aggregate productivity, Z 0.010 0.008 0.076 0.086
s ̃x
    Direct effect 0.075 0.075 0.078 0.078
    Productivity of the average firm 0.010 0.010 0.001 0.001
    Product innovation ‐0.076 ‐0.078 ‐0.003 0.008
  Aggregate production labor, L‐Lr 0.022 0.011 0.002 0.001
  Output, Y 0.032 0.019 0.077 0.087
  Consumption, C 0.032 0.029 0.077 0.088
  Ratio of indirect / direct effects, numerical ‐0.87 ‐0.89 ‐0.03 0.11
  Ratio of indirect / direct effects, theoretical ‐0.88 ‐0.90 ‐0.03 0.11
  Welfare 0.076 0.073 0.078 0.087
  Welfare in benchmark (all firms export, exog. exit) 0.075 0.077 0.075 0.077
s ̃x      TABLE 4
   Experiment 3: Effects of a Small Reduction in Marginal Trade Costs, with Positive Interest Rate and Elastic Process Innovation




  Curvature of process innovation cost function, b Moderate Low Moderate Low Moderate Low
  Export share, sx 0.076 0.075 0.076 0.075 0.075 0.077
  Hybrid export share, 0.009 0.022 0.009 0.022 0.073 0.072
Elasticity of Aggregate Variables across Steady States
  Negative of  (log change in variable / log change in D)
  Constant on variable profits, Πd ‐0.035 ‐0.089 ‐0.035 ‐0.089 ‐0.291 ‐0.289
Aggregate productivity Z 0 037 0 095 0 027 0 071 0 074 0 076
s ̃x
  Aggregate productivity, Z 0.037 0.095 0.027 0.071 0.074 0.076
    Direct effect 0.076 0.075 0.076 0.075 0.075 0.077
    Productivity of the average firm 0.623 2.663 0.623 2.663 0.046 0.258
    Product innovation ‐0.663 ‐2.654 ‐0.673 ‐2.678 ‐0.047 ‐0.259
  Aggregate production labor, L‐Lr 0.112 0.292 0.060 0.159 0.005 0.015
  Output, Y 0.148 0.387 0.087 0.230 0.079 0.091
  Consumption, C 0.148 0.387 0.142 0.384 0.079 0.091
  Ratio of indirect / direct effects, numerical ‐0.52 0.26 ‐0.64 ‐0.06 ‐0.02 ‐0.01
  Welfare 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.078 0.075 0.077
  Welfare in benchmark (all firms export, exog. exit) 0.075 0.075 0.077 0.077 0.075 0.075
s ̃x                   TABLE 5
             Experiment 4: Effects of a Large Reduction in Marginal Trade Costs, with Positive Interest Rate and Elastic Process Innovation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Research Good Produced with Labor Only (λ=1) Research Good Produced with Labor + Goods (λ=0.5)
Parameters
  Curvature of process innovation cost function, b High Moderate Low High Moderate Low
  Export share, initial steady state 0.075 0.076 0.075 0.075 0.076 0.075
  Export share, new steady state 0.088 0.100 0.167 0.088 0.100 0.167
Elasticity of Aggregate Variables across Steady States
  Negative of  (log change in variable / log change in D)
  Constant on variable profits, Πd ‐0.019 ‐0.040 ‐0.114 ‐0.019 ‐0.040 ‐0.114
  Aggregate productivity, Z 0.008 0.041 0.168 0.008 0.030 0.119
    Direct effect + Productivity of the average firm
a 0.108 0.862 7.518 0.108 0.862 7.518
    Product innovation ‐0.099 ‐0.821 ‐7.350 ‐0.100 ‐0.832 ‐7.399
  Aggregate production labor, L‐Lr 0.015 0.125 0.557 0.008 0.067 0.303
  Output, Y 0.023 0.166 0.725 0.015 0.097 0.423
  Consumption, C 0.023 0.166 0.725 0.022 0.158 0.711
  Welfare 0.082 0.083 0.088 0.080 0.083 0.092
  Welfare in benchmark (all firms export, exog. exit) 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.082 0.082 0.082
    
aWe do not separately report the direct and indirect effects on average productivity because equation (32) is not very precise with a large change in  D.Fig. 1.—Transition dynamics of exports/output from a decline in marginal trade costs. 
 
 